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The objective oJ'this paper is to examine the extent to which the independent directors are independent
of management and to what extent they are busy. From a sample of 200 non-Jinance Malaysian listed
firms for the 2009 and 2010 financial years, it is observed that the almost 60% of the independent
directors haw professional backgrounds qnd another 20ok are either serving or retired government
servants. Hence, by virtue of their training, a majorily of them are independent and abjective. Findings
also show that the largest shareholders of the samplefirms are asfollow: families (66%o), government
(4%o); institutions (8%o). On average, there are I 5 fomily members or 2l%o of the board size. While the
role of senior independent directors is very important in a concentrated ownership environment, only
one quarter of the samplefirms appoint senior independent directors. Out of 135 family ownedfirms,
only one fifth appoint senior independent directors. As for board chairman, only 30ok of sample firms
and family owned firms appoint independent directors as the board chairman. In terms of independent
directors' busyness, on averqge, each independent director holds one directorship in other listedfirms.
All independent directors seem to attend all board meetings. Hence, the independent directors appear to
be not so busy and are able to discharge their duties.
Keyworcls: board of directors, independent directors, nomination committee, busyness
: |.r i iti.t i_ii ic"ii,JlJ
In Malaysia, like any other East Asian countries, most of the listed firms are controlled by families. In
fact, it has been found that two-thirds of East Asian companies are controlled by a single largest
shareholder (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000). They also document that more than two-thirds of
Malaysian listed companies are in family hands. Further, they show that 35V;o of the top 20 Malaysian
listed companies are controlled by families and it goes to 84Yo for the smallest 50 companies. In an
earlier survey, Claessens, Djankov, Fan andLang (1999) foundthat one-fourth of Malaysian corporate
sectors are controlled by 10 families. Being the largest shareholders, these families not only these
families control the appointments of the board members, they also appoint the firm's CEO who is
usually from their family. Since the board and the CEOs are involved in identifying the potential
independent directors, the issue the "independence" of the independent directors always arises,
especially in Malaysia where the cultwe of "network" or "guanxi" or "know who" plays a very
important role.
The busyness of the independent directors is another issue in Malaysia as there is a limited pool of
qualified individuals to serve on the boards. In addition to serving the board, independent directors also
invariably sit on several board committees of the firm6. Because there are only tv/o or three independent
directors on the board, inevitably these independent directors will sit on the firm's NC, AC and perhaps
on the firm's RC7 as well. These two areas, i.e. the independence of the independent and the busyness of
the independent directors, will determine the effectiveness of the independent directors. Hence, the
u MCCG 2000 .""ommends the establishment of the nominaling committee (NC) and the remuneration commi$ee (RC)
7 MCCG r""o.*ends that the RC be composed wholly ofnon-executive directors.
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objectives of this research are as follows: (1) to determine the independence of the independent
directors, and (2) to determine the busyness of the independent directors by examining their
memberships on the firm's board's sub-committees and on other listed frms' boards.
Literatur"e Review
Conporate Governance im Malaysia
Corporate governance in Malaysian firms is largely shaped by the ownership patterns, which is closely-
held in nature. Concentrated ownership is a result of family ownership of the Chinese. Their family
businesses grew in size and eventually were listedS. Upon listing, the family continues to control the
company with their significant shareholdings. By virtue of their shareholdings, they appoint the firm's
top management and the directors who are among their family members. It is also a common feature in
Malaysia for a family to own a number of listed companies and usually the ultimate owner is a private
company, which controlled by the family members. This often leads to pyramidal ownership structure
and to some extent, cross shareholdings also occur which could adversely affect the firm's corporate
governance structure. The pyramidal shareholdings always result in the largest shareholders enhancing
their control rights (LaPorta et a[., 1999). Using their control rights, the ultimate shareholders appoint
the bomd members who would act as the nominee directors and the top management of the firm whose
interests are aligned with the controlling shareholders interest' and to some extent, the owners also
actively participate in management (Khatri, Leruth and Piesse, 2003). Another notable consequence of
the concentrated and pyramidal ownership pattern is interlocking directorships where the same directors
serve on the board of the related firms, which complicate the firm's corporate govemance mechanisms.
In addition, having the same directors in a number of finns could lead to the risk of "group think".
Government ownership is another important ownership feature in Malaysia as a result of privatization of
entities such as Tenaga Nasional, Telekom Malaysia and Petronas Dagangan, by the then Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad in 1980's and 1990's. Upon the privatization, the Government still maintains its
control over these privatized entities via Khazanah Nasional and Ministry of Finance Incorporated. In
addition, the Government also formed Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) and Lembaga Tabung Hajilo
specifically to increase Bumiputera participation in the country's economy and savings. Hence, the
ownership by Chinese families and the Govemment resulted in Malaysian listed firms being closely-
held. In this environment, the protection of the minorify shareholders is always an issue. As a result, the
effectiveness of the board of directors especially on protecting the interest of the minority shareholders
hinges upon the independence of the board of directors and the effectiveness of the independent
directorsll.
The Malaysian Government has taken many initiatives in order to address the issue of corporate
govemance to ensure the capital market is attractive to investors. The Companies Act (1965) stipulates
on the minimum number of directors on a board and the fiduciary roles of the board members. The
Bursa Malaysia, in 1987, via the Listing Requirements mandated the appointment of independent
directors to the board of listed firms. Subsequently, in 1993, Bursa Malaysia mandated the establishment
of the audit committees. In 1998, the High Level Finance Committee was established by the government
to come with the recommendation on corporate governance in Malaysia. The output of the Committee
was The Malaysian Code on Corporate Govemance (MCCG) which was issued by the Securities
Commission in 2000. To enhance shareholder activism and protect minority interests, the Minority
8 The listing of small family firms was made possible when the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange created the Second Board for listing of smaller
firms in 1988. In 2008, the two boards were merged, known as the Main Board, and a new board, namely the ACE is created for firms which
are not qualified for listing on the Main Board.
9 Ho*"re., some ofthe funds that are managed by PNB are now opened for subscriptron by non Bumiputera.
l0 The principal objective oflembaga Tabung Haji is to provide aa avenue for the Muslims to deposit their money, who will then manage the
deposits and provide retums to the depositers whose aim is to have enough savings to go to Mecca to perform hajj.
11 MCCG 2000 asserts thal in the context of Malaysia, independence refers to independence fiom management and independence fiom a
si gni ficant shareholder.
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Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG)|2, was established in 2000 after a recommendation by the
Ministry of Finance in 1999. ln 2001, the Bursa Malaysia issued Revamped Listing Requirements which
introduced Chapter 15, which is known as Corporate Govemance, which included a clause on requiring
the board of a listed firm to "comply or explain" with regard to compliance with the MCCG in form of a
statement in the firm's annual report. The Chapter requires that a board have at least two of its directors
or a third of its size being independent directors. It states that a director should not hold more than l0
directorships in listed firms.
ln2OO7, the MCCG was revised aiming at strengthening the boardr3. Among the changes in MCCG
2007 ate on the roles of the Nominating Committee on the appointment of directors, annual assessment
of the effecfiveness of the board as a whole, disclosure on the number of board meetings in the amual
reports, the requirement that the audit committee be composed wholly of non-executive directors and
audit committee members be financially literate and at least one being a member of an accounting
association or body; disclosure in the annual report the activities and the frequency of the audit
committee meetings and establishment of an internal audit function which is answerable to the audit
committee.
To strengthen further the external auditors' fraternity, the government established the Audit Oversight
Board (AOB) in 2010 which established under the purview of the SC. The main role of the AOB is to
ensure that extemal auditors perform their duties as expected by the market and the general public. The
AOB is given the authority to register all external auditors, examine their works and revoke their
licenses ifnecessary.
In 2011, the Securities Commission issued Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 which provides the
action plans to raise the standards of corporate governance in Malaysia. The blueprint would be
implemented over a period of five years via changes in the MCCG and Bursa Malaysia Listing
Requirements. As a result, in 2012, MCCG 2012 was issued by the SC to replace the earlier MCCG
2000 and MCCG 2007. MCCG 2012 states that if the cumulative term of an independent director is
more than nine years, the director would be re-designated as non-executive directors or if the frm wants
to maintain the independence status of the director, the firm needs to explain in the annual report.
Though the CG Blueprint 2011 appeared to favor the appointrnent of independent board chairman; the
MCCG 2012 however settled with non-executive board chairnan. However, MCCG 2012 requires that
if the board chairman is not independent, the board must comprise a majority of independent directors.
In the I-II! at least half of the board members, excluding the board Chair, comprise independent
directors (Financial Reporting Council 20 10).
Tiae E*arei of Dfrect+x"s
The board of directors is at the peak of a firm's internal corporate govemance mechanisms and it acts on
behalf of the firm's shareholders. While the composition and the operation of the board is explained in
the various rules, Acts or Codes, the members and the operation of the board are derived from two
models: Anglo-Saxon or Germany-Japan model. The former stresses on the importance of the
shareholders the frm in the firm's corporate govemance. The latter, on the other hand, stresses on the
importance of the stakeholders in the firm's corporate governance. The board of the Anglo-Saxon model
comprises wholly directors that are appointed by the shareholders. On the contrary, the board of the
Germany-Japan model consists of directors from various stakeholders. While the shareholder model has
one board, the Germany-Japan model has two boards (i.e. the board of management and the board of
supervisors). The CEO commonly sits on the board of the shareholder model; the Germany-Japan
model, on the other hand, doesn't allow an individual to sit on both boards at any one time. Therefore,
compared to the board in the shareholder model, the board of supervisors in the Germany-Japan model is
" Members of the MSWG are the Employee Provident Fund (EPF), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (I-TAT), Lembaga Tabung Haji (TH),
Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial (PERKESO), and Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB)
13 The Code was revised to iflcorporate developments in corporale govemance around the world, especially u/ith the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
2002 as a result of the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in the US. The Code was also revised following the financial scandals involving
Transmile, which was dubbed as "mini" Enron.
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able to reduce the risk of the conflict of interest between management and supervisors as control and
ownership are clearly separated between the two boards.
The shareholder model seems to work well in an environment where ownership is dispersed; in a
dispersed ownership environment, no single shareholder dominates the appointment of directors and
thus the board as a whole. This is exactly the pattem of ownership in Western countries, such as the US,
the UK, Canada and Australia. However, the scenario is markedly different even though Malaysia has
adopted the shareholder model of corporate governance. Concentrated ownership is common in
Malaysian firms, which resembles the ownership pattern in some European countries, such as Germany
and Italy. Thus, the real corporate governance issue in Malaysia is on the alignment of the interest of the
firm's largest shareholders and the minority shareholders. Ownership concentration and board
composition me likely to be related to each other (Kim, Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard and Nofsinger,
2007). Hence, this situation leads to the conflict between the controlling shareholders and the minority
shareholders. While the controlling shareholders are well represented on the board (tlrrough nominee
directors or their family members) and management, the minority shareholders rely on the independent
directors to protect their interest.
Under a unitary board structure, the board plays dual roles: leadership and control and it is important the
board plays those two roles effective (Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2007). The
independence of the independent directors is pivotal in ensuring the board carries out the controlling and
monitoring function as argued by agency theory. The role of the board chairman in securing good
governance is very crucial so as to ascertain the board as a whole is effective and individual or small
group of individual should dominate the board's decision making (Securities Commission, 2000). The
independent board chairman is seen as more able to infuse the culture healthy debate on issues that are
brought the board and bring to the board a healthy scepticism and independence (Securities
Commission, 2000). All decisions made at the board level should not be in the interest of achieving
consensus which is always biased towards the views of the dominant voice at the meeting (Securities
Commission, 2000).
Lr Malaysia, as in other East Asian countries, shares of the listed frms are closely-held and thus the
issue of the conflict of interest between shareholders and the firm's managers does arise because the
controlling shareholders dominate the board, who in tum dominates the appointment of the CEO. Due to
the close relationship between the major shareholders, the decisions made by the board tend to benefit
the major shareholders but may not be in the best interest of other shareholders, i.e. the minority
shareholders and the stakeholders. This is where independent directors are needed to ensure that the
other board members and the CEO always consider the interest of the minority shareholders while
pursuing the interest of the major shareholders. Unless, the independent directors are independent and
effective, they will not be able to carry out the controlling and monitoring function as expected. Hence,
it is important that the right eco-system exists that enables the independent directors to perform their
duties effectively. To this end, the Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 (SC, 2011) emphasizes that the
boards are expected by the stakeholders to play the role of stewards and guardians of the frm. It further
says that the boards need "... to move away from their role as mere advisers to become active and
responsible fiduciaries." (Securities Commission,20ll,p.2l). Essentially, the board should emphasize
on the controlling role to ensure that the management pursues the interest of the firm's shareholders.
Noininatiom Committee
Nominating committee is an important element of corporate governance mechanism because it identifies
and nominates potential directors to the board. The independence of the committee is very crucial as so
that it is not being influenced by management or the controlling shareholders of the firm. Hence, the
nominees are individuals who are independent and are chosen based on merit. The US Congress (2002)
requires that nominating committee be composed wholly of independent directors. The MCCG 2000
recommends that every company establish a nominating committee composed solely of non-executive
directors, a majority of whom are independent directors. In MCCG 2007, the roles of the nominating
committee are clarified. For instance, when identifying a candidate for directorship, the nominating
committee needs to consider the candidate's skills, knowledge, expertise and experience,
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professionalism and integrity. In the case of a candidate for independent directorship position, the
candidate,s ability to Ar"It *g" the responsibilities/functions expected of an independent director needs
to be assessed by the 
"orroiir.. In addition, annually, 
the committee needs to assess and to document
properly the effectiveness of the board as a whole, the committees and each individual director including
in"irAip"oaent directors and CEO. In MCCG 2012,the nominating committee is explicitly required to
have measures to ensure that women candidates are also included in the firm's recruitment exercise for
directorship posts. This additional requirement is the firm is moving towards gradual achievement of the
Government's policy on3}o/o women on the boards.
A11 the above initiatives are intended to ensure that the nominating committee is independent and
effective in carrying its prescribed roles. Hence, the role of the nominating committee is very important
and in fact, Brown and Cayler (2006) reveal that there is a positive association between nominating
committee independence and firm p.ifo.r*"". However, Abdullah, Mohamad Yusof and Mohamad
Nor (2010) faii to find an association between nominating committee independence and financial
restatements in MalaYsian firms.
Mettrcdology
A total of 200 non-finance firms were randomly selected from the list of firms that were listed in 2009,
representing 27% of the population of listed frms (734). Shatified random sampling method was
employed t-o determine the sample frms. The data were hand-collected from the sample firms' annual
."po.t, for financial year 2009 and 2010. For the purpose of sampling, finance frms were excluded
because they are under different regulatory frameworks. The financial years for 2009 and 2010 were
chosen because the MCCG code was revised n 2OO7 and 2009 was a year after the Global Financial
Crisis in 2008. Hence, the financial years of 2009 and 2010 were appropriate to observe the impacts of
the revised MCCG.
The variables are measgred in the following manner. Board size is measured by the number of directors
on the board on the balance sheet date. Board independence is measured by the proportion of
independent directors on the board. Total assets are the sum of all assets on the balance sheet date.
Family directors are defined as those who have family relationship among themselves or with the largest
shareholders. Family owned firms are defined as firms whose shares are held by family members at 20
oZ or more. Government owned companies are companies whose shares are held by Government owned
investment arm, i.e. Khazanah Nasional, Ministry of Finance lncorporated and the state govemments'
Institutional shareholdings are the sum of the shares owned by institutional shareholders, including EPF,
pNB, LTAT, TH, PERLESO, SOCSO, banks and insurance companies. Institutional shareholders are
defrned as those organizations which pool large sums of money and invest those sums in shares,
properties or any assets. The percentagi of shares by the firm's largest shareholders is the cumulative
ihares both direit and indirect-ownership by an individuaVfamily/entity. Top thirty shareholdings are the
cumulative shares owned by the firm's thirry largest shareholders. Shares owned by executive directors
are the sum of direct and indirect ownership. ROA is measured by dividing profit after taxes by total
assets. Gearing ratio is computed by dividing total liabilities by total assets.
R.esults
A total of 400 firm years are available for analyses. Table 1 shows the population of listed firms, after
exciuding finance, ciose end funds and REITs, and the sample firms as at 31 December 2009. A total of
2j% of ih" lirt"d frms was included in the sample. Table I presents the descriptive statistics of the
sample firms.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics olfinn's characteristics
Variatrle Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skew.
Board meetings
Board size
Total assets (in RM million)
Shares owned by the largest shareholders (%)
tnstitutional shareholdings (%)
Top 30 shareholders (%)
Shares owned by executive directors (%)
Shares owned by non-executive (%)
Number of family directors
ROA (ratio)
Gearing (ratio)
s.53 1.978
7 .49 1.795
3,830.2 30,784.3
38.76 16.47
I 1.84 20.36
7 5.77 12.99
28.48 21.83
5.06 1r.65
1.65 t.1t
0.035 0.078
0.407 0.194
215
3 15
31.9 567,051..3
0 87.35
0 96.23
12.14 100
0 72.89
0 79.60
08
-0.45 0.30
0.00 0.91
2.05
0.78
16.16
0.35
2.46
-1.17
0.038
3.3 85
0.66
-1.08
0.18
Three observations are noted from the results in Table l. First, ownership is closely-held where top 30
shareholders on average hold about 76Yo ofa frm's shares. Executive directors, on the other hand, hold
almost a third of a flrm's shares. This indicates the significant voting power of a fitm's executive
directors. The combined shares owned by institutional shareholders stood at l2oh, which is quite
significant. However, individually, institutional investors generally hold insignificant amount of shares.
Second, the presence of family directors is evident where, on average, there are almost two family
directors on each board. Since on average there are eight directors on a board, family directors thus
make up about a quarter of the board. Hence, family directors on the board and executive directors'
ownership seem to be in tandem. Thild, gearing is about 40 Yo of a firm's total assets; hence for every
RM1 of asset,40 cents are from liabilities. Therefore, working capital management is very important in
order to meet the requirement to repay the liabilities when they are due. Table 2 presents the profiles of
independent directors.
A total of 2,997 board seats were available in these 200 firms for the 2009 and 2010 financial years, of
which, 1,320 were occupied by independent directors. Thus, about 44 Yo ofthe board seats are allocated
to independent directors. It is noted that the independent directors attended almost all board meetings.
On average, on each board, independent directors hold 3.3 directorships in other listed firms. Each
independent director, on the other hand, on average, holds one other outside directorship in other listed
firm. Hence, in terms of outside directorships, independent directors do not appear to over-commit
themselves. In terms of age, a majority of the independent directors are near their retirement age, i.e. late
50's. With regard to tenure as independent directors, a majority of them have served on the existing
boards for about seven year. As expected, independent directors do not hold a significant amount of
shares. To understand further about the background of the independent directors, an analysis on the
working experience was carried out and the results are shown in Table 3.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the independent directors
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skew.
No. of independent directors
Independent directors on the board (%)
Attendance at board meetings of independent
directors (%)
No. of outside directorships of independent
directors
Average outside directorships independent
directors
Average age ofindependent directors (years)
Average tenure of independent directors (years)
Shares owned by independent directors (%)
3.30 1.05
0.45 0.13
95.00 6.39
3.91 3.99 0
1.18 i.13 0
s8.73 6.47
6.87 4.05
0.28 t.t2
9 l.2l
I 0.86
r 00 -1.28
6 1.28
76 -0.01
23.3 1.03
7.58 4.91
I
0.r4
71.00
36
0.2s
0
t.7424
Table 3 Working experience of independent directors
Background Count o/" Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max Skewness
Politics
Entrepreneurship
Professional
Government
Others
3.86 0.13
17.50 0.58
56.74 1.87
20.84 0.69
1.06 0.04
51
23r
749
275
t4
a.42
0.75
1.03
0.89
0.44
3.83
1.0s
0.51
t.37
0.12
0
0
0
0
0
3
)
7
4
I
As indicated in Table 3, the majority of the independent directors are professionals (e.g. accountants,
lawyers, physicians, engineers and academics). On every board, there are about two professionals.
Because there is a requirement by Bursa Malaysia for each listed firm to have at least one qualified
acconntant, as a result, on every board, there is at least one accountant on each board. About 20 Yo afthe
independent directors have experience in the government service. These directors are appointed because
of their knowledge on the technical matters that involve the government authorities that the firms may
need to deal with. Politicians make up less than 5o/o of the total independent directors. Thus, the presence
of retired politicians is not really sigrrificant on the boards of Malaysian listed firms.
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Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics major shareholders and the chairmen of the boards and other
board committees.
Tabtre .4 lJinai:3r 1i2vi;i[1s5
Yes
Variable Count Count Yo
CEO non-duality
Family owned firm
Government linked company
Independent B oard Chair
Presence of Senior Independent director
Establishment ofNC
Establishment of RC
Independence of the chairman ofNC
lndependence ofthe chairman ofAC
Independence ofthe chairman ofRC
315
269
27
127
95
367*
367*
302
392
302
78.8
67.25
2.5
31.75
23.8
91.7 5
91.75
82.28
89
82.28
85
131
JIJ
273
305
JJ
JJ
65
8
65
2t.2
32.72
97.5
68.25
76.3
8.25
8.2s
17.72
ll
17.72
It is found that for 40 companies, RC and NC are combined. The majority of the sample firms are family
owned and only abo:ut 3Yo are Govemment Linked Companies (GLC). While almost 80% of sample
firns separate the board chairman and CEO roles, only a third of the board chairmen of the sample firms
are independent. Thus, a majority of the board chairmen are not independent and are related to the firm's
largest shareholders. Therefore, the independence ofthe board as a whole &om the largest shareholders
might be impaired. One of the mechanisms a firm can adopt to ensure board independence in close-held
hrms is through the appointment of a senior independent director. However, the shown in Table 4, only
95 firms had senior independent directors on their boards as compared to 296 closely-held flrms (269
family-owned firms arrd 27 GLCs). Thus, only 32Yo of closely-held firms have senior independent
directors. [r terms of the chairman of board committees, about 83% of the chairmen of nomination
committees and remuneration committees are independent. While this is encouraging, it is vital that the
chairman of these board committees be independent to ensure independence in the committee's
decisions and judgments especially when it involves the nomination of new directors and the
remuneration of the executive directors which should be performance-based. Table 5 shows details of
the composition and activity of the audit, nomination and remuneration committees. The evidence will
indicate the busy-ness ofthe independent directors.
As shown in Table 5, AC, NC and RC require six independent directors. Since on average there are three
independent directors on a board, the evidence suggests that each independent director is a member of
two committees. A total of eight annual meetings are convened by these three committees. As the
average annual board meetings are eight, therefore, the total meetings in a year required for an
independent director is about 14 (i.e. 5.5. board meetings and 8 committee meetings). It should be noted
that on average, an independent director also holds another independent directorship in other listed frm.
Thus, annually, each independent director needs to attend a total of 28 meetings, which translates into
about two meetings a month. Table 6 shows details of the presence of senior independent directors.
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Table 5 Nomination Committee, Audit Committee and Remuneration Committee
Variable N* Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness
Size of NC 367
IndependentdirectorsonNC 367
Percentageofindependentdirectors 367
onNC
Frequency of NC meetings 181
$ize ofAC 400
Independent directors on AC 400
Percentageofindependentdirectors 400
on AC
Frequency of AC meetings 399
Size ofRC 367
Independent directors onRC 367
Percentageofindependentdirectors 367
onRC
Frequency of RC meetings 210
Age of Senior Independent directors 95
3.t7 0.74
2.47 0.73
79% 0.22
1.46 1.06
3.rs a.44
2.75 0.57
86% 0.16
4.96 1.37
3.26 0.86
2.23 0.81
69% 0.23
t.72 1.59
63.05 7.09
8 3.08
4 -0.s3
1 -0.91
7 2.49
s 2.r0
5 -0.09
r.00 -0.70
15 2.64
I 2.t6
4 -0.17
1 -0.53
9 2.64
77 -0.82
I
0
0
0
2
I
0.33
I
I
0
0
I
42
Table 6 Cross-tabulation of the presence of Senior Independent Directors
Presence of Senior Independent Director
Variable Status Yes No Total
Family firm
GLC firm
CEOnondualiE
Board Chair
NC chairman
Yes
No
Total
Yes
No
Total
Yes (separated)
No (combined)
Total
Independent
Non independent
Tota]
Independent
Non independent
Total
s8
37
95
8
87
95
85
10
95
30
65
95
74
19
93
2ll
94
305
t9
286
305
230
75
305
97
208
305
228
46
274
269
131
400
27
373
400
315
85
400
t27
273
400
302
65
367
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The presence of senior independent directors in family-owned frms is about 2lo/o md in GLCs is about
3002. Hence, even GLCs are not inclined towards appointing senior independent directors. Interesting
observations are noted with regard to CEO duality and the independence of the chairman of NC. Out of
95 firms which appointed senior independent directors, 85 firms separated the roles of the CEO and
board chairman. Similarly, 74 senior independent directors are found in firms which appointed
independent chairman for their NCs. Therefore, the separation of the CEO and board chairman roles as
well as independent NC chairman seems to be important in the decision to appoint senior independent
directors.
Discussion and Coilclusion
The issue of independent directors is important they are seen as the ones who will protect the interest of
all shareholders of a firm, especially the minority shareholders. While about 45 o/o of lhe board members
are independent, it is very crucial that the board chairman is independent. The importance of
independent board chairman lies on the fact that the board chairman leads the board and decides on the
board agenda. An independent board chairman is needed in order to balance between ownership and
control (Securities Commission, 201 l). In fact, 'oAn independent chairman will be in a position to
marshal the board's priorities more objectively and provide a voice for the independent directors."
(Securities Commission, 201 l, p. 32).
The fact that a majority of the independent directors are professionals or retired professionals or top
officials in the government service suggests that independent directors are appointed in order to seek
their professional advice and expertise. Professional and (ex) top government servants make up about
76Yo of the independent directors. Perhaps also the independent directors serve as the window to the
world for the board. Hence, the appointment of independent directors is consistent with resource
dependency theory ffeffer 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Resource dependency theory sees the
board as an essential link between the frm and external resources, which is crucial for maximizing firm
performance. The board is regarded as an important resource for a firm because it provides a link with
the extemal environment (Hillman, Canella and Paetzold 2000; Palmer and Barber 2001). It has been
argued that the ability of the board to link the frm with significant resources is one of the board's key
roles (Korac-Kakabadse, Korac-Kakabadse and Kouzmin 20011, Zahra and Pearce 1989).
Being professionals could suggest that independent directors are objective and independent in their mind
and actions. Since professionals are bound by the Code of Ethics oftheir professional affiliations, even
in the absence of a Code of Ethics in the firm, the independent directors will continue to act
independently and objectively always strive to give the best as they are bound by the Code of Ethics of
their profession. However, the question that remains is whether these independent directors can
collectively ensure that the whole board acts in the interest of all shareholders and takes into account the
interest of other stakeholders. As the number of independent directors on a board is about three out of
about seven or eight directors, it is somewhat diffrcult for the independent directors to protect the
interest of the other shareholders as well as the stakeholders if it involves an issue which favors the
majority shareholders. Another important issue relating to independent directors is their tenure. An
independent director who has served a board for too long may compromise his or her independence and
objectivity. Therefore, in MCCG 2012,there is a limit for the tenure of an independent director, which is
9 years. The result in this study revealed that the average tenure is about seven years. Hence, if the
requirement on the tenure is to be enforced strictly, a majority of independent directors will be re-
designated as non-independent directors in two years' time.
In terms of the busy-ness, the independent directors in Malaysia do not appear too busy as each of them
on average holds directorship in another listed firm. According to Ferris, Jaganathan and Pritchard
(2003), busy directors are those who hold more than two outside directorships at the same time. Hence,
given that each independent director holds two directorships at any particular time and the fact that they
are either retired or near retirement, they should be able to give their commitment as a director. In fact,
the average board meetings are found to be about five times ayear. Further, their attendance to board
meetings is almost perfect, which is at 95o/o.
64
Proceedings ofthe 2ntl Applied International Business Conference (AlBC20l3) 7 
- 
8 December 2013
As a conclusion, the backgrounds of independent directors, who are professionals and retired
government servants, suggest that they are independent and objective. However, there is a high risk that
the independent directors are not able to exercise their independent judgment as the board chairman
found to be not necessarily independent. Second, the practice of appointing senior independent directors
is not prevalent where only 95 frms had appointed senior independent directors. In light of the very high
incidence of non-independent board chairmen and closely held firms, the presence of senior independent
directors is very important as the independent directors need support from the senior independent
directors to enable them to exercise their independent judgment. The recommendation in the MCCC
2012 onthe need for a board to be composed in majorify of independent directors if the board chairman
is not independent could address fhe issue of board independence. ln addition, almost all firms have
established nominating committees even in the absence of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements. Thus,
this is a positive development. Thfud, the independent directors do not appear to be busy as the majority
hold only one directorship in other listed frm. Thus, they should be able to give their commitment to the
firms that they appointed as director. This is supported by the fact that they attended almost all board
meetings.
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